




Luring Investment through Higher Taxes: Evaluating the Impact of New York City 





A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of Architecture, Planning and Preservation 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 














Advisor: Moira O’Neill 







Business improvement districts (BID) are a widely used tool intended to address 
quality of life concerns and promote economic development. While BIDs have been 
shown to provide a variety of positive impacts to their districts, it is less clear whether 
these impacts translate into increased levels of commercial property development within 
the district. There is also a question of whether any observed increases in development 
is a result of existing economic resources that have been shifted from surrounding 
districts. This thesis attempts to quantify the impact of New York City’s BIDs on 
commercial property development both within BIDs and their surrounding 
neighborhoods. To evaluate a BIDs role as an economic development tool, this thesis 
uses a difference-in-differences approach to compare the number of construction 
permits both in and around three Manhattan BIDs before and after the BIDs were 
established. Results show that BIDs do not play a significant role in increasing levels of 
commercial property development within their districts and neighborhoods surrounding 
BIDs do not experience a decline in commercial property development after a nearby 
BID is established. These results call into question a BIDs role as a major economic 
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I. Introduction and Background 
 
Cities have long sought ways to increase funding in order to provide better 
municipal services. Business Improvement Districts (BID) have offered an alternative 
approach. BIDs are “local organizations into which merchants and firms pay mandatory 
fees in order to supplement the package of public services in their local area” (Schwartz 
et al., 2006, pg. 1). In many cases, a BID can be considered a hyper local level of 
government that exists to serve businesses and property owners within its district. 
These districts are able to provide only the services that it believes will best serve its 
constituents and can change its offerings quickly in response to changes in the area in 
which it serves. To a municipality, BIDs are particularly advantageous as they can 
provide the level of service that is desired within a district without the need for additional 
municipal funds. 
 
BIDs in New York City 
 
BIDs are enabled by laws at the state level. In New York State, this enabling law 
was first passed in 1980 (Kennedy, 1996). This law allows for the establishment of a 
district that is run by a district management association and has the ability to charge 
fees in exchange for services. The enabling law in New York State writes that this 
district charge “shall be determined, levied, and collected in the same manner, at the 
same time and by the same officers, as general municipal taxes are levied and 
collected” (NY Gen Mun L § 980-M, 1980). Once the BID is established, the New York 





management association that is established to oversee the BID (Kennedy, 1996, pg. 
294). By law, New York City cannot reduce municipal services to a BID even if the BID 
is providing a similar service (Baird-Remba, 2017). BIDs can be, and often are, 
incorporated as non-profits and the district management association that runs the 
district must have a board of directors which is composed of representatives of owners 
and tenants within the district (NY Gen Mun L § 980-M, 1980, Kennedy, 1996). In New 
York City, the creation of BIDs is a strategy undertaken by the City to promote economic 
growth (Berg, 2007). A BIDs main focus is to promote the businesses within its district 




The first BID was established in Toronto in 1970 with the first BID in the United 
States established in 1975 in New Orleans (Schwartz et al., 2006). The first district 
resembling a BID in New York City was established in 1976 along Fulton Mall in 
Downtown Brooklyn under legislation authorizing Special Assessment Districts 
(Campion, Champeny, 2017). The first BID established under the 1980 BID enabling 
law was the Union Square Partnership which was established in 1984 (Kennedy, 1996). 
While adoption of BIDs in New York City was initially slow through the first half of the 
1980’s, the number of BIDs rapidly increased thereafter (Campion, Champeny, 2017). 
In New York City, BIDs are overseen by the New York City Department of Small 







As of 2019, there were 76 BIDs in New York City. The majority of these BIDs are 
located in Manhattan and Brooklyn (NYC SBS, 2019). Many BIDs are concentrated in 
the City’s major commercial districts and retail corridors. The largest BIDs in terms of 
budget are located in places such as Times Square, Bryant Park, and the Financial 
District (NYC SBS, 2019, pg. 17). All of the City’s BIDs combined cover roughly 2% of 
New York City’s land area yet represent an area which produces 26% of the City’s sales 
tax, 27% of the City’s property tax, and contains 36% of the City’s assessed value (NYC 
SBS, 2019, pg. 13).  






The primary function of a BID is to provide an array of basic services to the area 
inside its borders. While these services are often already provided by the municipality, 
the BID is focused on providing an enhanced level of many of these same services. 
Common BID services include sanitation, public safety, marketing, public events, and 
general improvements to the public realm (NYC SBS, 2019).  
 
Of these services, the largest investment is placed into improvements in 
sanitation. Adding together all of New York City’s BIDs, $43.1 million was spent on 
sanitation services in 2019 alone (NYC SBS, 2019, pg. 38). This budget was spent 
employing 722 sanitation workers to empty trash receptacles along the 289 linear miles 
of streets covered by the BIDs and resulted in the collection of over 4 million bags of 
trash in 2019 (NYC SBS, 2019, pg. 38). Marketing and public events accounted for the 
second highest investment category with over $35 million spent across 74 BIDs with 
relevant programs in 2019. This money was used to fund marketing programs to attract 
shoppers to each district, host events, maintain a social media presence, and install 
holiday lighting (NYC SBS, 2019, pg. 40). Public safety also accounts for a large portion 
of BID spending with over $25 million spent in 2019. This money was spent to employ 
337 public safety staff to patrol the districts and was also used for investments in 
physical infrastructure such as installing additional lighting and security cameras (NYC 
SBS, 2019, pg. 42).  
 
In New York City, BIDs are run by a nonprofit district management association. 





board of directors (Campion, Champeny, 2017). The board oversees the BIDs 
operations and financial activities and is responsible for hiring an executive director. The 
board of directors, by law, must include the local City Council Member, the City 
Comptroller, the local Borough President, and the Mayor. The rest of the board must be 
composed of commercial property owners, commercial tenants, and residents who are 
elected by members of the district (Campion, Champeny, 2017).  
 
The formation of a BID in New York City involves a process that takes about two 
years (Schwartz et al., 2006). The process starts when a local group reaches out to the 
Department of Small Business Services (Campion, Champeny, 2017). This local group 
then forms a steering committee which is comprised mostly of property owners but also 
includes local elected officials, residents, community organizations, commercial tenants, 
and local not-for-profits (NYC SBS, n.d.). This committee then sets tentative BID 
boundaries, assembles a database of all affected property owners, determines 
assessment formulas, and determines what services and improvements the BID will 
provide. After the committee develops a draft plan for the BID, the outreach process 
begins. This process involves reaching out to any businesses and property owners that 
fall within the proposed BID boundaries (NYC SBS, n.d.). After distributing informational 
packets and holding public hearings, the BID proposal moves to the legislative 
authorization process which culminates when the City Council and Mayor adopt the 
proposed BID. The BID is formally established when the Department of Small Business 
Services signs a contract with the district management association that will operate the 






Current Landscape of BIDs in New York City 
 
The number of BIDs in New York City has steadily grown over the years to 
include BIDs in a vast array of neighborhoods. BIDs in New York vary in size 
dramatically. The City’s largest BID in terms of budget is the Times Square Alliance BID 
with a 2019 budget of over $22 million. At the other end of the spectrum, the City’s 
smallest BID is the 180th Street BID in Jamaica, Queens with a 2019 budget of just over 
$70,000 (NYC SBS, 2019). Most BIDs citywide fall on the smaller end with a median 
2019 budget of $552,585 across all the City’s BIDs. BIDs are now present in all five 
boroughs. Manhattan and Brooklyn hold the most at 25 and 23 BIDs respectively. 
Queens has 13 BIDs, the Bronx has 11, and Staten Island has 4. Some larger BIDs 
employ a team of up to 50 full-time employees to manage the BIDs day-to-day 
operations. The smaller BIDs may have only one or two full-time employees or may be 



















As the number of BIDs has continued to grow both in New York City and 
elsewhere, numerous studies have attempted to analyze and quantify the impact of 
these districts.  
 
Schwartz, Ellen, and Meltzer (2006) attempt to quantify the effect of BIDs on 
local property values (Schwartz et al., 2006). This study compares commercial 
properties from within a selection of New York City BIDs to commercial properties in 
what the study classifies as the “spillover zone”, an area outside of a BID’s boundaries 
but within the same zip code as the BID (Schwartz et al., 2006). The study used data on 
sales transactions for these properties to track changes in property values in and 
around the 44 BIDs that the study analyzed. Data on sales transaction prices were 
obtained from the New York City Department of Finance while data on building 
characteristics was obtained from a dataset used for property tax assessment. To 
measure impacts, the study used hedonic regression models in an attempt to explain 
property sale prices while including structural characteristics and neighborhood location. 
The study then used a difference-in-difference approach to attempt to see if differences 
in price have changed over time and if these changes were related to the establishment 






The study found that overall, the price per square foot of commercial properties 
in BIDs was around 30% higher in the five years after the creation of a BID compared to 
the five years before the BID was created (Schwartz et al., 2006). Further, the study 
found that the impact to commercial property values varied widely based on the revenue 
of the BID, a metric which often determines the level of services that the BID can 
provide (Schwartz et al., 2006). The study also found that changes to property values in 
areas classified as a “spillover zone” were statistically insignificant. The results of this 
study confirm that BIDs have a positive effect on property values for properties within 
BID boundaries, however, the study also finds that this positive effect does not extend 
beyond the BIDs boundaries. This study identifies the challenges of measuring 
neighborhood impacts from BIDs. Neighborhoods that have formed BIDs may have 
different characteristics from other neighborhoods. Moreover, there is also the 
possibility that BID formation is catalyzed by larger changes in the neighborhood which 
are also responsible for the increase in property values (Schwartz et al., 2006). 
 
Brook (2006) attempts to quantify the effect of BIDs on the incidence of crime in 
Los Angeles. Using data that tracks incidences of crime from the Los Angeles Police 
Department, the study matched the LAPD reporting districts where these crimes 
occurred to BID boundaries. The study used a fix effects approach to compare crime 
levels before and after BID designation while controlling for neighborhood 
characteristics. The results of the study showed that, overall, crimes within BID 
boundaries decreased by 10% after the BID was established. Further, the study found 





by 22% in these areas (Brooks, 2007). The results of this study confirm that the extra 
provision of public safety provided by BIDs may have caused a significant decline in 
overall crime rates, especially the rate of serious crime. 
 
MacDonald et al. (2010) attempts to quantify the effect of BIDs on the incidence 
of violent crimes in Los Angeles. The results of this study seem to align with the results 
of Brook (2006). Using data from the Los Angeles Police Department, this study 
examined incidences of violent crime in 30 separate BIDs before and after the BIDs 
were created. This study aggregated any LAPD reporting district that is either partially 
or fully within a BID as an area that experiences impacts from the BID. To assess the 
difference in incidences of crime before and after the BID was established, the study 
used a Bayesian hierarchical model. The study found that the implementation of a BID 
was associated with a 12% decrease in the incidences of robbery and an 8% decrease 
in total violent crimes within the studied areas (MacDonald et al., 2010). These results 
further confirm that BIDs can be attributed to lower crimes rates within district 
boundaries. 
 
BID Structure and Governance 
 
While research has shown that BIDs generally have a positive impact on the area 







In many ways, BIDs have the authority of a local government but have an 
organizational structure that more closely resembles that of a nonprofit. BIDs are able to 
leverage taxation powers to collect funds from constituents within the district, a power 
usually only found in government. At the same time, BIDs are run by an executive 
director who manages funding, the BIDs other employees, and the daily functions of the 
BID. According to Briffault, BIDs are the combination of special districts and public 
authorities, “combining the distinctive revenue stream of the former with the governance 
structure and relative autonomy of the latter” (Briffault, 1999, pg. 420). Since BIDs seem 
to resemble a local level of government, criticism has been raised over the lack of 
accountability of BIDs given their management structure and motivations.  
 
The primary function of BIDs is to provide additional services within commercial 
areas in addition to the municipal services that are already provided (Campion, 
Champeny, 2017). These services, such as sanitation, marketing, and public safety, are 
mostly intended to improve business conditions within the district (NYC SBS, 2019). 
Given these functions, BIDs mostly work with business and property owners within their 
district to discuss how the services provided can have the largest impact. Critics argue 
that since BIDs are formed and funded in part by private business interests and are run 
by leadership that is not elected by the wider public, BIDs are “private governments” 
that are heavily influenced by the private interests they serve (Morcol, Karagoz, 2020).  
 
This question of accountability comes into sharper focus when a BID considers 





that helped to create them and the business interests that fund their activities (Morcol, 
Karagoz, 2020). This power to govern the BID likely comes from the fact that these are 
the only two bodies that can decide to dissolve the BID (Campion, Champeny, 2017). 
As long as the BID satisfies the interests of property owners within its district, it is 
unlikely that it will face opposition that will threaten its operation.  
 
This lack of accountability outside the business community raises questions 
given that residents who live within BID boundaries are likely to be affected by the 
services that the BID prioritizes whether it is sanitation or public safety. Despite this, 
residents who live in a BID often have little to no say in how the BID functions. Most 
residential properties are exempt from paying fees to BIDs and therefore BIDs often do 
not have a large motivation to prioritize their needs (Campion, Champeny, 2017). 
People who are homeless are not represented within BIDs and instead find themselves 
as a target of a BIDs actions. There have been documented cases of BIDs forcing those 
experiencing homelessness out of their districts in order to make the area more 
attractive (Morcol, Karagoz, 2020). In addition to residents who reside within a BID, 
residents and businesses outside the BID boundaries may also find their needs ignored 
by the neighboring BID even if the BIDs operations have a large impact on their quality 
of life and daily functions.  
 
Even among business and property owners, a BID may not provide equal 
representation. Representation and influence within a BID can often favor those that 





assessments on properties within their districts. These assessments are calculated 
based on the individual property’s market value. In New York, properties within BIDs are 
charged, on average, 0.09 percent of their total market value annually (Campion, 
Champeny, 2017). This type of payment structure causes some properties to pay 
substantially more into the budget of the local BID than other properties within the same 
district. Additionally, the New York City Council can dissolve a BID based on a petition 
of at least 51% of owners within the district or owners of at least 51% of the district’s 
assessed value (Campion, Champeny, 2017). BIDs therefore must keep the owners of 
the most valuable properties satisfied to ensure that the BID is able to continue 
operating. As a result, BID management may place more value in the opinions of the 
properties that pay the most into the BID (Heller, 2017).  
 
Another source of concern for small business owners in BIDs is the composition 
of the BIDs board of directors. By law, in New York City, the majority of a BIDs board of 
directors must be composed of property owners within the BID (Ponce de Leon, 2019). 
There is concern that the interests of the property owners and small business owners 
within the district may not be aligned and that this misalignment could be reflected in the 
services a BID chooses to provide. Property owners may push for BIDs to enact 
improvements that raise land values even while smaller businesses may benefit more 
from increased foot traffic through marketing campaigns. In the long run, small 
businesses may be priced out of a neighborhood through improvements made by the 








While BIDs exist primarily to improve the area within its boundaries, there have 
long been concerns that they may also have an impact on surrounding neighborhoods. 
Briffault notes that this surrounding effect may often times be negative. He writes that 
“BID security and order maintenance programs may displace crime and social problems 
onto adjacent communities”.  Additionally, he notes that “BID marketing and 
development programs may draw customers and investment away from other areas of 
the city” and that “BID efforts to promote a sense of district distinctiveness may detract 
from the unity of the city as a whole” (Briffault, 1999, pg. 456).  
 
One instance of this competition for investment occurred in New York City at the 
end of the 20th century. Nasdaq, the second largest stock market of the United States, 
was considering the construction of a new headquarters in Times Square and shifting its 
operations from its previous location in the Financial District in Lower Manhattan 
(Leonard, 1999). One of the main opponents of the move was the Alliance for 
Downtown New York, a business improvement district that encompasses a large part of 
Lower Manhattan including the Financial District. The Alliance for Downtown New York 
was concerned that losing Nasdaq’s new offices to Midtown would be a significant 
setback for the Financial District’s economy even as City officials stressed that New 
York would benefit from the new headquarters regardless of the neighborhood that 





up in Midtown, the pressure to locate their offices in a different BID shows how a BID’s 
goals do not necessarily align with those of the City as a whole.  
 
One of the main benefits of BIDs for local businesses and property owners is that 
the entirety of payments made to the BID go to improvements enacted locally. This is 
unlike general property taxes which can be spent in any part of a city. This fact has the 
potential for long-term negative impacts to other parts of a city. Once a local area is 
covered by the services of a BID that are paid for directly by money from that same 
area, there may be a greater reluctance among local businesses to pay municipal taxes. 
Briffault writes that “if business areas could fund more of their services through district 
taxes, they might seek to lower general municipal taxes, thereby reducing revenues 
available for services elsewhere in their cities” (Briffault, 1999, pg. 466). In the long run, 
lower municipal taxes could result in a deterioration of municipal services in other parts 
of a city including areas just outside the BID itself.  
 
Tax Increment Financing 
 
There are numerous other strategies that municipalities have used to attract 
economic development within a targeted area in addition to BIDs. One of these 
strategies has been the use of Tax increment financing (TIF). The idea behind TIF is 
that public investment in infrastructure projects or incentives will spur private 
development which will eventually pay for itself through higher property values, 





of a defined district where economic development initiatives are targeted. Within these 
districts, a large project is identified as necessary for economic development. Instead of 
a municipality paying for these projects up front, any future increases in tax revenue 
from the district are set aside for a designated amount of time to pay for the project. In 
the end, the hope is that the project will pay for itself through increased economic 
activity and higher tax revenue. In some places, the use of TIF in a district allows for the 
use of eminent domain to seize a property targeted for economic development and 
transfer the property to another private party to be redeveloped (Heller, 2017). This 
gives any district targeted for redevelopment using TIF the tools needed to undertake a 
large project that may not otherwise be feasible. 
 
TIF has been used for numerous high-profile public projects in recent years 
including the extension of the 7 line of the New York City Subway from its former 
terminus in Times Square to the new 34th Street - Hudson Yards Station (Campion, 
2017). The use of TIF was supposed to allow for this costly extension to proceed 
without state or federal assistance (Lincoln Inst, 2017). The idea was that the extension 
of the subway line would help to enable the construction of the Hudson Yards 
development on Manhattan’s West Side. It was believed that the Hudson Yards 
development would become a major revenue source and would allow for the repayment 
of the extension in the future because of the new economic activity generated. The end 
result proved to be an enormous cost to taxpayers. Not only was the Hudson Yards 
development, the project’s anticipated revenue source, massively delayed because of 





cost overruns (Fisher, Leite, 2018). Once the Hudson Yards development was fully 
opened, it was estimated that upwards of 90 percent of commercial tenants at the new 
development relocated from nearby Midtown Manhattan which was faced with growing 
vacancy rates (Baird-Remba, 2017). Much of the economic activity in Hudson Yards 
came at the expense of other parts of the City. 
 
An analysis of the use of TIF in the Chicago area reveals a similar pattern (Dye, 
Merriman, 2002). Although using TIF was found to increase growth within a designated 
area, measured using equalized assessed property values, this growth often came at 
the expense of other areas within the same municipality. In the end, the study found that 
municipalities which adopted TIF were found to grow slower overall than those which 
did not adopt TIF. The study concludes by writing that the results “bolster the hypothesis 
that TIF redirects economic activity to TIF designated areas at the expense of the rest of 
the city” (Dye, Merriman, 2002, pg. 324). These results suggest that TIF may simply 





Past literature has shown that the use of TIF geographically relocated economic 
resources within the same municipality without bringing in new economic growth. BIDs, 
like TIF districts, are used as an economic development tool to facilitate growth within 





whether BIDs also geographically relocate economic resources instead of facilitating 
new growth that would not have happened otherwise. Is the positive effect that BIDs 
bring to their districts at the expense of other areas outside the district? Do BIDs 
concentrate economic growth that would have otherwise occurred in areas outside the 
district? This study attempts to quantify the impact of the establishment of a BID on 





III. Methods and Data 
 
This study involves a quantitative approach using difference-in-differences 
estimation to attempt to understand a BID’s effect on property development within its 




Difference-in-differences is an estimation technique that attempts to capture 
changes associated with the implementation of a specific policy or program. It does this 
by comparing data between a control group, data that is unaffected by the new policy or 
program, and a treated group, data that is affected by the new policy or program. This 
estimation technique attempts to quantify the effect of the new policy or program by 
taking the difference between the average differences of the control and treated group, 
before and after the policy intervention. Difference-in-differences is useful in that it 
removes bias that results from permanent differences between the control and treated 
group and thus is able to more accurately capture changes associated with the 




To measure property development, this study used a dataset created by the New 
York City Department of Buildings (DOB) that contains all permits for construction and 





Data], 2020). This dataset includes permits for buildings undergoing alterations and 
renovations. The dataset has more than 3.7 million entries with 60 descriptive columns 
and is updated daily. Past studies have shown that building permits can be a good 
indicator of property development (Billings, 2015, Propheter, 2020). 
 
Given that this study attempts to evaluate the impact of BIDs on capital in 
surrounding neighborhoods, spatial parameters need to be carefully classified. This 
study uses spatial classifications based in part on the classification in Schwartz, Ellen, 
and Meltzer (2006), another study that investigated a BIDs impact on the larger 
community. BID properties are classified as all properties on lots that are within the 
BID’s boundaries. The immediate neighborhood is classified as properties which are on 
lots that are outside the BID but are within a census tract that contains the BID. These 
properties form the closest ring around the BID. The control group consists of a larger 
area outside the BID and immediate neighborhood. This larger neighborhood is 
classified as properties which are within the same zip codes as the BID but are outside 
of both the BID and census tracts that contains the BID. 
 
One way to examine a BIDs impact on property development both within its 
boundaries and surrounding areas is to examine both areas before and after the BID 
was established. This shows whether the establishment of the BID caused a shift in 
property development across the BID and the immediate neighborhood. To ensure the 
BID’s effects are accurately captured, the three classified areas are examined five years 





Given that the process to establish a BID can take two years, there may already be 
decisions on investments that are made based in anticipation of the coming BID. Five 
years before the establishment of the BID ensures that this effect is minimal if existent 
at all. Examining effects five years after the establishment of the BID gives the BID an 
opportunity to commence operations and have an impact on the district. Although 
potential construction projects that may be affected by the creation of the BID may not 
be completed within those five years, because this study examines active permits, those 
projects will be captured even if they have only commenced the construction permitting 
process within the five-year period. 
 
The DOB dataset contains all construction and demolition permits starting in 
1990. BIDs that are analyzed include those that have an establishment date that allows 
for a five-year period on both ends which falls within 2020 and 1990, the range of the 
dataset. This narrows potential BIDs to be studied to those that were established 
between 1995 and 2015.  
 
Past studies have demonstrated that larger BIDs in terms of budget have larger 
impacts on the district and surrounding community. BIDs that are classified by the New 
York City Department of Small Business as having a budget of $1 - $5 million, the 
second highest category, will be chosen for this study in order to ensure that any 
significant effects can be captured (NYC SBS, 2019). BIDs classified in the largest 
category are generally much older and were established in a New York City with a 






Nine Manhattan BIDs fit these criteria. Out of these nine, the three BIDs that did 
not share a border with another BID were chosen. This is to ensure that the immediate 
and larger communities surrounding a BID capture minimal impacts from other BIDs. 
The BIDs selected include the Meatpacking District, established in 2015, Flatiron/23rd 
Street, established in 2006, and Hudson Square, established in 2009 (NYC Open Data, 
2020). 
Figure 3: Selected Business Improvement Districts 
 
With this data on building permits and the three selected BIDs, this study uses a 
difference-in-differences estimation to investigate whether the establishment of the 
selected BIDs, the treatment, is correlated with a change in levels of property 
development, measured by number of building permits issued, in the BID and 








Given that BIDs in New York City primarily collect assessment fees from 
commercial properties, only permits for projects that occur in commercial spaces are 
used, such as office buildings or retail space. Although residential units may be affected 
by the existence of a BID, BIDs provide services that are primarily meant to improve 
business conditions within the district (NYC SBS, 2019). Permits that occur in retail 
spaces within residential buildings are included. Permits for residential spaces are 
distinguished in the DOB’s dataset and were excluded. 
 
The dataset includes permits issued for a number of project types including 
permits for minor projects and routine maintenance. As this study attempts to measure 
larger capital investments in properties in relation to a nearby BID, many permits for 
minor projects were excluded. The excluded permits include those issued for equipment 
work such as boiler and HVAC projects as well as those issued for construction 
equipment, plumbing, and signage. The permits retained for this study are those for 
alterations, demolition, foundation/earthwork, and new buildings.  
 
The main points of interest for these issued permits within the data is both the 
coordinates of the building for which the permit was issued as well as the “filing date”, 
the date that the permit for the project was filed. The few permits with NA values for 






The resulting data was then split into ten-year groups for each of the chosen 
three BIDs with five of the years being before the BID was established and five of the 
years being after. For each BID, the entire dataset of permits was spatially clipped into 
three distinct groups, those within the BID itself, those within census tracts that contain 
the BID but outside the BID itself, and those within zip codes which contain the BID but 
outside of both the BID and the census tracts which contain the BID. The permits in 
each of these groups was then spatially joined to the census blocks in which they were 
located.  
 
The number of permits per census block was normalized by using the total 
number of buildings within each census block. The total number of buildings was 
obtained through New York City’s PLUTO dataset (New York City Department of City 
Planning, 2021). All residential buildings were filtered out of the dataset leaving only 
commercial and institutional structures, consistent to the filtering method used for the 
building permits. For each census block, the number of permits was divided by the total 
number of relevant buildings. This process resulted in a value representing the number 
of permits per building in each census block, the primary variable of interest. 
 
After these spatial operations, the permits for each BID study area were then 
combined into two datasets, one that contains all permits in both the BID and the zip 
code, and one that contains all the permits in the census tract and the zip code. Dummy 
variables were added based on both the location and timing of the permits. The first 





were issued either before or after the establishment of the BID. This “After BID” variable 
was assigned a value of one if the census block contains permits that were filed after 
the establishment of the specified BID and a zero if the census block contains permits 
that were filed before the BID was established. Another dummy variable was used to 
distinguish whether the census block was in the treated area, within the BID or the 
census tract, or in the control group, within the zip code but out of the BID and 
associated census tracts. This “Treated” variable was assigned a value of one if the 
census block is located in the treated group and a zero if the census block is in the 
control group. A third dummy variable combines the two. This “After BID Treated” 
variable is given a value of one if the census block both contains permits filed after the 















The overall results of the difference-in-differences estimation are mixed. There 
were no statistically significant findings for the number of issued permits per building for 
the census blocks within the BID or immediate neighborhood outside the BID when 
compared to those census blocks within the control group. 
 
One of the more interesting results is that, across the three BIDs included in the 
analysis, the coefficients for the areas within BIDs after the BID was established are 
negative while the coefficients for the immediate neighborhood after the establishment 
of a BID are positive. This may indicate that in general, the census blocks within the 
immediate neighborhood just outside a BID were associated with the issuance of more 
building permits than the census blocks within the BID boundaries after the 
establishment of the BID. This result is especially interesting given that it is essentially 
the opposite of what may have initially been assumed. 
 
Examining the Data 
 
Reviewing the spatial distribution of issued permits across the study areas of 
each BID before and after the establishment of each BID, as shown in Figures 5-7, also 
reveals interesting results. For the Meatpacking District, before the BID was 
established, there is a clear area within the future BID boundaries with high levels of 
issued permits. There are also high rates of issued permits along the southern and 





edge of the study area capture the boundaries of the Hudson Square BID. The northern 
edge of the study area captures the on-going development in the Hudson Yards area 
which has witnessed significant investment and construction throughout the first two 
decades of the 21st century. The large area just to the south of the BID, consisting 
mostly of the West Village, shows low rates of issued permits. The spatial distribution of 
these permits both before and after the establishment of the Meatpacking District BID 
remains relatively unchanged. 
Figure 5: Distribution of Permits for the Meatpacking District BID (permits per 







The spatial distribution of issued permits across the study area of the 
Flatiron/23rd Street BID is much more dispersed. There is no clear area with high rates 
of issued permits that align with the BID boundaries. Both the area along the northern 
edge of the study area, in the area of Herald Square, and to the west, in the area of the 
Meatpacking District, are areas that show high rates of issued permits. The Herald 
Square area is covered by the 34th Street Partnership, one of the City’s largest and 
oldest BIDs (NYC SBS, 2019). There is no clear change in the pattern of issued permit 
distribution before and after the establishment of the BID.  
Figure 6: Distribution of Permits for the Flatiron/23rd Street BID (permits per 






The study area containing and surrounding the Hudson Square BID reveals a 
spatial distribution similar to that of the Meatpacking BID. There is an area with high 
rates of issued permits that roughly aligns with the boundaries of the BID. The study 
area also shows high levels of issued permits along the northern edge of the study area 
in the area within the Meatpacking District. Areas to the north and east of the BID, which 
includes parts of both the West Village and Soho, reveal lower relative levels of issued 
permits. There is no clear change in distribution before and after the BID is established.  
Figure 7: Distribution of Permits for the Hudson Square BID (permits per building 








The lack of significant findings in this analysis is revealing. BIDs have been 
shown to provide a variety of positive benefits to the property owners within their 
districts. These positive benefits include increasing property values and reducing crime 
(Schwartz et. al., 2007, Brooks, 2008, MacDonald et. al., 2010). From this, it could be 
expected that BIDs may also be associated with higher levels of property development 
since they provide an environment that is more conducive to business. These results, 
however, indicate that BIDs may not play a significant role in driving property 
development within their districts compared to other areas of the City.  
 
The prevalence of negative coefficients for the BID itself and positive coefficients 
for the immediate neighborhood, the area just outside the BID boundary, is also an 
intriguing outcome. While there is not enough statistically significant evidence to show 
that the establishment of a BID actually increased property development in the BID’s 
immediate neighborhood, the results seem to indicate that the establishment of a BID 
did not actively shift property development from this immediate neighborhood to the new 
BID. These results seem to discredit the notion that BIDs attract property development 
at the expense of other areas. While what this implies for the future of BIDs is unclear, it 
does contribute to evidence that the negative impact on areas surrounding BIDs may be 






The lack of a significant outcome among the coefficients could simply indicate 
that while BIDs may have an impact on their districts, larger economic trends may be 
the main driver in determining property development. An increase in property 
development could also drive the establishment of a BID, not the other way around, 
obscuring any results. Both the Flatiron/23rd Street BID, established in 2006, as well as 
the Hudson Square BID, established in 2009, include the 2008 economic crisis within 
their analyzed timeframe. This particular economic crisis heavily affected the real estate 
market and could have dampened or eliminated any potential visible benefits that a BID 
would create.  
 
The spatial distribution of issued permits both before and after the BIDs were 
established also reveals a pattern. While there was no clear pattern for the Flatiron/23rd 
Street BID, both the Meatpacking District and Hudson Square BIDs reveal high levels of 
issued permits within BID boundaries even before the establishment of the BID. 
Although these BIDs have high levels of issued permits within their respective districts, 
because these high levels of issued permits were in place before the establishment of 
the BID, these relative higher numbers are not captured within the difference-in-
differences estimation.  
 
This pattern may reveal a couple of possibilities. One is that BIDs are generally 
established in areas with certain characteristics that are already witnessing high levels 
of property development. This would imply that BIDs are created in response to 





to encourage property development. This possibility could be tested by running a similar 
analysis on neighborhoods with similar characteristics to these areas but without a BID. 
 
Another possibility is that property development may already start in anticipation 
of the establishment of a BID. That is to say, if it is suspected that a BID may be 
established, levels of development may increase despite the fact that the BID has not 
officially been established and commenced operations. This could be tested by 
increasing the time parameters to measure permit levels further in the past. 
 
Future studies could attempt to quantify the monetary amount associated with 
each issued building permit. While many of the most minor building permits were not 
included in this analysis given that routine maintenance work is not a good indicator of 
major property investment, it could be that permits issued within BIDs were generally 
associated with higher levels of investment than those issued within the immediate 
neighborhood. Running a similar analysis using approximated monetary amounts for 
each building permit would give a better idea of just how much property investment a 










Although the results of this analysis shows that BIDs in New York City may not 
significantly drive property development in the form of commercial building permits 
issued, BIDs still very clearly have an effect on the properties within their district. It is 
known that through the provision of services, BIDs raise property values and decrease 
incidences of crime, especially major crimes (Schwartz et. al., 2007, Brooks, 2008, 
MacDonald et. al., 2010). While the services provided may be considered beneficial to 
supporting the retail environment of an area, a BIDs role as an economic development 
tool is called into question. 
 
A somewhat surprising outcome of this analysis is that immediate neighborhoods 
just outside a BID’s boundaries generally fared better than the areas within the BID 
boundary in terms of the number of permits issued per building per census block. This 
outcome is surprising given that the services that BIDs provide are only provided to the 
areas within the district boundaries. This may suggest that, while these services 
improve the general conditions of the district, these services may not be worth the extra 
assessment that property owners and businesses are required to pay to locate within 
the district. Another possibility is that any incentives for locating within a BID derived 
from the extra services provided is offset by the BID assessment fee. The average 
annual BID assessment fee for properties located within a BID ranges from 0.09% - 
0.17% of a building’s market value depending on the size of the BID, with larger BIDs 





Champeny, 2017). While this assessment fee may be relatively small, it could be 
enough to offset the benefits provided by the increased level of services. 
 
It is clear that BIDs are a useful tool when it comes to improving local conditions 
at key areas of the City. This is especially true for areas which already have a strong 
commercial base and require higher levels of municipal services than are currently 
being provided by the City government. In these cases, businesses can collectively 
decide to pitch in to receive extra services such as sanitation or public safety that can 
reduce the responsibilities put on individual businesses as well as enhance the 
conditions of the district.  
 
New York City should consider three central factors when establishing future 
BIDs. First, BIDs do not appear to concentrate development at the expense of 
surrounding neighborhoods. The establishment of a BID does not appear to be linked to 
a significant increase in property development within the BID boundaries. At the same 
time, surrounding areas do not appear to have a significant decrease in property 
development after the BID was established. 
 
Second, BIDs should be viewed as a way to improve quality of life concerns 
within a district, not as a major economic development tool. While BIDs have been 
shown to be effective at improving conditions directly related to the services that they 
provide, the larger economic effects of a BID may be overstated. The main reasoning 





While BIDs have also been shown to increase property values, it does not appear that 
this effect translates into a larger increase in investment in the area (Schwartz et. al., 
2007).  
 
Third, new BIDs should be targeted to areas with a strong existing commercial 
base. Larger BIDs have been shown to be more effective at improving local conditions 
and increasing property values than smaller BIDs (Schwartz et. al., 2007). Additionally, 
larger BIDs are able to reduce the burden of the cost of the new services on individual 
property owners by spreading this burden among a larger number of properties 
(Campion, Champeny, 2017). This is reflected in the lower assessment fees which 
larger BIDs charge as a percentage of overall property values (Campion, Champeny, 
2017). As BIDs do not appear to encourage significant levels of new property 
development, establishing BIDs in struggling commercial areas that are targeted by the 
City for redevelopment may do more harm than good. The costs imposed on property 
owners and businesses in these struggling commercial corridors may be far higher than 










The number of BIDs in New York City has expanded quickly throughout the last 
decade of the 20th century and the first two decades of the 21st century. Much of the 
excitement surrounding BIDs is due to the fact that they allow for additional services, 
normally only provided by the City, which address numerous concerns within the City’s 
commercial corridors without any additional municipal funding. While many economic 
incentives generally depend on lowering taxes and expenses to lure new businesses, 
BIDs offer the opposite, an additional fee for additional services.  
 
The results of this study suggest that BIDs do not negatively affect areas outside 
of the district as seen with other types of economic development tools. Further, these 
results suggest that the role BIDs play in larger economic development processes may 
be overstated. BIDs can still be considered a useful tool for addressing certain concerns 
in some of the City’s busiest commercial corridors. However, both the benefits provided 
by a BID as well as the costs associated with a BID may simply not be significant 
enough to influence larger development patterns throughout the City.  
 
While it seems clear that the rate at which new BIDs in New York City are 
established is unlikely to slow down anytime soon, it is worth continuing to clarify the 
role in which BIDs play in the City’s commercial districts and the clear benefits and 
consequences that a BID offers. It is clear that the City should not attempt to use BIDs 
as a one-size-fits-all approach when attempting to revitalize commercial areas. BIDs 





commercial areas. Even still, BIDs remain as a useful tool to address quality of life 








Table 1: Hudson Square BID Difference-in-Differences Results 
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) lower ci upper ci
(Intercept) 0.51162 0.09087 5.63 3.66e-08 *** 0.333 0.69
inTreatment 1.34237 0.25349 5.296 2.09e-07 *** 0.844 1.84
afterBID -0.08707 0.1285 -0.678 0.498 -0.34 0.166
inTreatment:afterBID -0.48612 0.35849 -1.356 0.176 -1.19 0.219
---
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 1.135 on 354 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.1038, Adjusted R-squared: 0.09622
F-statistic: 13.67 on 3 and 354 DF, p-value: 1.864e-08
 
Table 2: Hudson Square Immediate Neighborhood Difference-in-Differences Results 
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) lower ci upper ci
(Intercept) 0.51162 0.09785 5.228 2.29e-07 *** 0.319 0.704
inTreatment 0.15213 0.13335 1.141 0.254 -0.11 0.414
afterBID -0.08707 0.13839 -0.629 0.529 -0.359 0.185
inTreatment:afterBID 0.03829 0.18859 0.203 0.839 -0.332 0.409
---
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 1.222 on 672 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.005682, Adjusted R-squared: 0.001243










Table 3: Meatpacking District BID Difference-in-Differences Results 
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) lower ci upper ci
(Intercept) 0.5853 0.19 3.08 0.002229 ** 0.212 0.959
inTreatment 1.6422 0.4892 3.357 0.000875 *** 0.68 2.6
afterBID 0.0849 0.2687 0.316 0.752236 -0.444 0.613
inTreatment:afterBID -0.7291 0.6919 -1.054 0.2927 -2.09 0.632
---
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 2.343 on 354 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.04003, Adjusted R-squared: 0.03189
F-statistic: 4.92 on 3 and 354 DF, p-value: 0.002319
 
Table 4: Meatpacking District Immediate Neighborhood Difference-in-Differences Results 
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) lower ci upper ci
(Intercept) 0.5853 0.2482 2.358 0.0188 * 0.098 1.07
inTreatment 0.8874 0.4176 2.125 0.0341 * 0.067 1.71
afterBID 0.0849 0.351 0.242 0.809 -0.605 0.775
inTreatment:afterBID 0.3345 0.5906 0.566 0.5714 -0.826 1.5
---
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 3.06 on 466 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.02835, Adjusted R-squared: 0.02209










Table 5: Flatiron/23rd Street Partnership BID Difference-in-Differences Results 
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) lower ci upper ci
(Intercept) 0.75828 0.08724 8.692 <2e-16 *** 0.587 0.93
inTreatment -0.0591 0.27777 -0.213 0.832 -0.604 0.486
afterBID -0.16831 0.12337 -1.364 0.173 -0.411 0.074
inTreatment:afterBID -0.06594 0.39283 -0.168 0.867 -0.837 0.705
---
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 1.582 on 726 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.003398, Adjusted R-squared: -0.00072
F-statistic: 0.8252 on 3 and 726 DF, p-value: 0.4802
 
Table 6: Flatiron/23rd Street Partnership Immediate Neighborhood Difference-in-
Differences Results 
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) lower ci upper ci
(Intercept) 0.75828 0.08002 9.477 <2e-16 *** 0.601 0.915
inTreatment -0.11639 0.15525 -0.75 0.454 -0.421 0.188
afterBID -0.16831 0.11316 -1.487 0.137 -0.39 0.054
inTreatment:afterBID 0.03291 0.21956 0.15 0.881 -0.398 0.464
---
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 1.451 on 892 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.003974, Adjusted R-squared: 0.000624
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